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Abstract 
 
In recent years, the security issues on MANET have become one of the primary 
concerns. The MANET is more vulnerable to be attacked than wired network. 
These vulnerabilities are nature of the MANET structure that cannot be removed. 
As a result, attacks with malicious intent have been and will be devised to exploit 
these vulnerabilities and to cripple the MANET operation. Attack prevention 
measures, such as authentication and encryption, can be used as the first line of 
defense for reducing the possibilities of attacks. However, these techniques have 
a limitation on the effects of prevention techniques in general and they are 
designed for a set of known attacks. They are unlikely to prevent newer attacks 
that are designed for circumventing the existing security measures. For this 
reason, there is a need of second mechanism to “detect and response” these 
newer attacks, i.e. “intrusion detection”. This paper aims to explore and to 
classify current techniques of Intrusion Detection System (IDS) aware MANET. 
To support these ideas, a discussion regarding attacks, IDS architectures, and 
researches achievement on MANET are presented inclusively, and then the 
comparison among several researches achievement will be evaluated based on 
these parameters. By this way, several existing security problems on MANET 
can be probed quickly for future researches. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In MANET, a set of interacting nodes should cooperatively implement routing functions to enable 
end-to-end communication along dynamic paths composed by multi-hop wireless links. Several 
multi-hop routing protocols have been proposed for MANET, and most popular ones include: 
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Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) [1], Optimized Link-State Routing (OLSR) [2], Destination-
Sequenced Distance-Vector (DSDV) [3] and Ad Hoc On-Demand Distance Vector (AODV) [4]. 
Most these protocols rely on the assumption of a trustworthy cooperation among all participating 
devices; unfortunately, this may not be a realistic assumption in real systems. Malicious nodes 
could exploit the weakness of MANET to launch various kinds of attacks. 
 
Node mobility on MANET cannot be restricted. As results, many IDS solutions have been 
proposed for wired network, which they are defined on strategic points such as switches, 
gateways, and routers, can not be implemented on the MANET. Thus, the wired network IDS 
characteristics must be modified prior to be implemented in the MANET.  
 
The rest of this paper will be structured as follows. Section 2 describes background of the IDS. 
The Intrusion detection on MANET is presented on section 3. In section 4, we present a 
discussion regarding the IDS classification. Finally, the conclusions and future research are 
shown in section 5. 
 
2. IDS BACKGROUND 
An intrusion-detection system (IDS) can be defined as the tools, methods, and resources to help 
identify, assess, and report unauthorized or unapproved network activity. Intrusion detection is 
typically one part of an overall protection system that is installed around a system or device—it is 
not a stand-alone protection measure.  
 
Intrusion detection has a bit more history behind it. Endorf [5] stated that the intrusion detection 
was introduced as a formal research when James Anderson wrote a technical report [6] for the 
U.S. Air Force. Thus, it has been followed by Denning [7], Heberlein [8], and many researchers 
until present day.  
 
Depending on the detection techniques used, IDS can be classified into three main categories [9] 
as follows: 1) signature or misuse based IDS), 2) anomaly based IDS, 3) specification based IDS, 
which it is a hybrid both of the signature and the anomaly based IDS.  
• The signature-based IDS uses pre-known attack scenarios (or signatures) and compare them 
with incoming packets traffic. There are several approaches in the signature detection, which 
they differ in representation and matching algorithm employed to detect the intrusion 
patterns. The detection approaches, such as expert system [10], pattern recognition [11], 
colored petri nets [12], and state transition analysis [13] are grouped on the misuse.  
• Meanwhile, the anomaly-based IDS attempts to detect activities that differ from the normal 
expected system behavior. This detection has several techniques, i.e.: statistics [14], neural 
networks [15], and other techniques such as immunology [16], data mining [[18[, [19]], and 
Chi-square test utilization [17]. Moreover, a good taxonomy of wired IDSes was presented by 
Debar [20].  
• The specification-based IDS monitors current behavior of systems according to specifications 
that describe desired functionality for security-critical entities [48]. A mismatch between 
current behavior and the specifications will be reported as an attack.  
 
3. MANET INTRUSION DETECTION 
There are three focuses in this section: attacks, IDS architectures grouping, and researches 
achievement. The “researches achievement review” uses several parameters such as the IDS 
architectures, the detection techniques (see section 2), the resistance to several attacks type, and 
the routing protocols (see section 1). 
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3.1 ATTACKS 
The MANET is susceptible to passive and active attacks [21]. The Passive attacks typically 
involve only eavesdropping of data, whereas the active attacks involve actions performed by 
adversaries such as replication, modification and deletion of exchanged data. In particular, 
attacks in MANET can cause congestion, propagate incorrect routing information, prevent 
services from working properly or shutdown them completely [[22],[25],[26],[23],[24],[27]].  
 
Nodes that perform the active attacks are considered to be malicious, and referred to as 
compromised, while nodes that just drop the packets they receive with the aim of saving battery 
life are considered to be selfish [[28],[26]]. A selfish node affects the normal operation of the 
network by not participating in the routing protocols or by not forwarding packets. In addition, a 
compromised node may use the routing protocol to advertise itself as having the shortest path to 
the node whose packets it wants to intercept as in the so called black hole attack [[29], [30]]. 
 
Spoofing is a special case of integrity attacks whereby a compromised node impersonates a 
legitimate one due to the lack of authentication in the current ad hoc routing protocols [[35],[36]]. 
The main result of the spoofing attack is the misrepresentation of the network topology that may 
cause network loops or partitioning. Lack of integrity and authentication in routing protocols 
creates fabrication attacks [[37],[4],[38]] that result in erroneous and bogus routing messages. 
 
Denial of service (DoS) is another type of attack, where the attacker injects a large amount of 
junk packets into the network. These packets overspend a significant portion of network 
resources, and introduce wireless channel contention and network contention in the MANET 
[[39],[40]]. A routing table overflow attack and sleep deprivation attack are two other types of the 
DoS attacks [41].   In the routing table overflow attack, an attacker attempts to create routes to 
non-existent nodes. Meanwhile the sleep deprivation attack aims to consume the batteries of a 
victim node.  
 
There are also more sophisticated routing attacks. Compared to the simple attacks described 
above, these sophisticated attacks are much harder to detect and to prevent, i.e.: wormhole 
attacks (two compromised nodes create a tunnel that is linked through a private connection and 
thus they by-pass the network [[31],[32]]),  rushing attacks [33] and sybil attacks [34]. 
 
3.2 IDS ARCHITECTURES 
Based on the network infrastructures, the MANET can be configured to either flat or multi-layer. 
The optimal IDS architecture for the MANET may depend on the network infrastructure itself. 
There are four main architectures on the network [43], as follows: 1) Standalone IDS, 2) 
Distributed and Collaborative IDS, 3) Hierarchical IDS, and 4) Mobile Agent for Intrusion 
Detection Systems. 
 
• In the standalone architecture, the IDS runs on each node to determine intrusions 
independently. There is no cooperation and no data exchanged among the IDSes on the 
network. This architecture is also more suitable for flat network infrastructure than for multi-
layered network infrastructure 
 
• The distributed and collaborative architecture has a rule that every node in the MANET must 
participate in intrusion detection and response by having an IDS agent running on them. The 
IDS agent is responsible for detecting and collecting local events and data to identify possible 
intrusions, as well as initiating a response independently.  
 
• The hierarchical architecture is an extended version of the distributed and collaborative IDS 
architecture. This architecture proposes using multi-layered network infrastructures where the 
network is divided into clusters. The architecture has cluster heads, in some sense, act as 
control points which are similar to switches, routers, or gate ways in wired networks. 
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• The mobile agent for IDS architecture uses mobile agents to perform specific task on a nodes 
behalf the owner of the agents. This architecture allows the distribution of the intrusion 
detection tasks. There are several advantages using mobile agents [[21], [42]], for intrusion 
detection. 
 
 
3.3 RESEARCHES ACHIEVEMENT 
 
Many researchers have proposed several IDS especially for the MANET, some of them will be 
reviewed in the following paragraph.  
 
Since the nature of MANET node is distributed and requires cooperation to other nodes, Zhang, 
Lee, and Huang [[30], [24]] proposed “intrusion detection (ID) and response system” should 
follow both the natures. In this proposed architecture model, each node is responsible for 
detecting signs of intrusion locally and independently, but neighboring nodes can collaboratively 
investigate in a broader range. Individual IDS agents are placed on each and every node. Each 
the IDS agent runs independently and monitors local activities (user and systems activities, and 
communication activities within the radio range). The agent detects intrusion from local traces and 
initiates response. If anomaly is detected in the local data, or if the evidence is inconclusive and a 
broader search is warranted, neighboring IDS agents will cooperatively participate in global 
intrusion detection actions. These individual IDS agents collectively form the IDS system to 
defend the wireless ad-hoc network. 
 
FIGURE 1: IDS agent model 
 
Albers et al. [44] proposed a distributed and collaborative architecture of IDS by using mobile 
agents. A Local Intrusion Detection System (LIDS) is implemented on every node for local 
concern, which can be extended for global concern by cooperating with other LIDS. Two types of 
data are exchanged among LIDS: security data (to obtain complementary information from 
collaborating nodes) and intrusion alerts (to inform others of locally detected intrusion). In order to 
analyze the possible intrusion, data must be obtained from what the LIDS detects on, along with 
additional information from other nodes. Other LIDS might be run on different operating systems 
or use data from different activities such as system, application, or network activities; therefore, 
the format of this raw data might be different, which makes it hard for LIDS to analyze. However, 
such difficulties can be solved by using Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) data 
located in Management Information Base (MIBs) as an audit data source. Such a data source not 
only eliminates those difficulties, but also reduces the increase in using additional resources to 
collect audit data if an SNMP agent is already run on each node. For the methodology of 
detection, Local IDS Agent can use either anomaly or misuse detection. However, the 
combination of two mechanisms will offer the better model. Once the local intrusion is detected, 
the LIDS initiates a response and informs the other nodes in the network. Upon receiving an alert, 
the LIDS can protect itself against the intrusion. 
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FIGURE 2: LIDS Architecture in a Mobile Node 
 
Kachirski and Guha [45] proposed a multi-sensor intrusion detection system based on mobile 
agent technology. The system can be divided into three main modules, each of which represents 
a mobile agent with certain functionality, i.e.: monitoring, decision-making and initiating a 
response. 
 
FIGURE 3: Layered Mobile Agent Architecture 
 
• Monitoring agent: Two functions are carried out at this class of agent: network monitoring and 
host monitoring. 
 
• Action agent: Every node also hosts this action agent. The action agent can initiate a 
response, such as terminating the process or blocking the node from the network, if it meets 
intrusion activities where it lives. 
 
• Decision agent: The decision agent is run only on certain nodes, mostly at the nodes that run 
network monitoring agents. If the local detection agent cannot make a decision on its own 
due to insufficient evidence of an intrusion, it will report to this decision agent in order to 
investigate deeply on the suspected node 
 
Since nodes move arbitrarily across the network, a static hierarchy is not suitable for such 
dynamic network topology.  
 
Satria Mandala, Md. Asri Ngadi, A.Hanan Abdullah 
International Journal of Computer Science and Security, Volume (2) : Issue (1) 6 
Sterne et al. [46] proposed a dynamic intrusion detection hierarchy that is potentially scalable to 
large networks use clustering. This method is similar with Kachirski and Guha [45], but it can be 
structured in more than two levels. Thus, nodes on first level are cluster heads, while nodes on 
the second level are leaf nodes. In this model, every node has the task to monitor, log, analyze, 
respond, and alert or report to cluster heads. The Cluster heads, in addition, must also perform: 
1) Data fusion/integration and data filtering, 2) Computations of intrusion, and 3) Security 
Management. 
 
FIGURE 4: Dynamic Intrusion Detection Hierarchy 
 
B.Sun [47] proposed Zone Based IDS (ZBIDS). In the system, the MANET is spitted into non-
overlapping zones (zone A to zone I). The nodes can be categorized into two types: the intra-
zone node and the inter-zone node (or a gateway node). Each node has an IDS agent run on it. 
This agent is similar to the IDS agent proposed by Zhang and Lee. Others components on the 
system are data collection module and detection engine, local aggregation and correlation 
(LACE) and global aggregation and correlation (GACE). The data collection and the detection 
engine are responsible for collecting local audit data (for instance, system call activities, and 
system log files) and analyzing collected data for any sign of intrusion respectively. The 
remainder, LACE module is responsible for combining the results of these local detection engines 
and generating alerts if any abnormal behavior is detected. These alerts are broadcasted to other 
nodes within the same zone. However, for the GACE, its functionality depends on the type of the 
node. If the node is an intra-zone node, it only sends the generated alerts to the inter-zone nodes. 
Thus, if the node is an inter-zone node, it receives alerts from other intra-zone nodes, aggregates 
and correlates those alerts with its own alerts, and then generates alarms. The intrusion response 
module is responsible for handling the alarms generated from the GACE. 
 
FIGURE 5a: ZBIDS for MANETs 
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FIGURE 5b: An IDS agent in ZBIDS 
4. DISCUSSION AND SUMMARY 
The classification among the proposed IDS of MANET can be composed using the parameters 
discussed in the previous sections, i.e.: architecture, attacks, and IDS detection techniques. Most 
the MANET IDSes tend to have the distributed architectures and their variants. The IDS 
architecture may depend on the network infrastructure (see section 3.2). But the most important 
thing is the reasons the architecture to be configured in distributed manner. As the nature of 
MANET is so open, attacks source can be generated from any nodes within the MANET itself or 
nodes of neighboring networks. Unfortunately, this network lacks in central administration. It is 
difficult for implementing firewall or the IDS on the strategic points. Moreover, each node can 
work as client, server or router. Delivery packets need collaboration work among the nodes 
participant network. For these reasons, the IDS of MANET should have characteristics that follow 
these natures, distributed and collaborative. Zhang [30], Albers [44], and Sun [47] follow this idea. 
Meanwhile, Kachirski [45] and Sterne [46] use the variant of the distributed and collaborative. 
Advantage using distributed architecture is the security accident can be detected earlier. 
However, this architecture needs huge resources, which is difficult to be implemented in small 
wireless device as PDA.  
 
All attacks type of wired networks is possible in MANET. MANET has also several typical of 
attacks, which are not available in the traditional wired network, such as selfish attack, black hole 
attack, sleep deprivation attack and others type of attacks (see section 3.1). These attacks occur 
because of MANET has vulnerable in the use of wireless link, auto-configuration mechanisms, 
and its routing protocol. The existing MANET IDSes have various methods to detect and to 
response regarding these attacks. Zhang [30] and Sun [47] proposed the IDSes which were 
designed for detecting the intrusion activities on the routing protocol of MANET.  Albers [44] tried 
to extend the traditional IDS on MANET to detect incoming telnet connections and reacted if they 
originated from outside community’s network. Sterne [46] presented a cooperative and distributed 
IDS that covered conventional attacks. Table 1 shows the summary of the classification of these 
MANET IDS. 
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Addressed Attacks type 
Author(s) Name Specific Architecture 
Au-
then-
tica-
tion 
Routing 
(black hole, 
etc) 
Sel-
fish Data Source Technique detection 
Routing 
protocol 
Environm
ents 
Contribution 
Zhang and 
Lee, Y. 
Huang [30], 
[24] 
None Distributed 
and 
collaborative 
No Yes 
(misrouting,  
packet 
dropping) 
No Audit trail 
(event log 
processing) 
Anomaly AODV, 
DSR, 
DSDV 
Simulation IDS agent for 
collaboration 
detection 
P. Albers, O. 
Camp [44] 
LIDS Distributed 
and 
collaborative 
No No No Audit trail 
(event log 
processing)  
Misuse, 
anomaly  
Not 
identified 
Simulation Local IDS 
mobile agent 
for intrusion 
detection 
model 
Kachirski 
and Guha 
[45] 
None Hierarchical 
architecture 
No No No Audit trail 
(event log 
processing)  
Anomaly Not 
identified 
Simulation Hierarchical 
IDS using 
mobile agent 
Sterne et al. 
[46] 
None Hierarchical 
architecture 
No No No Audit trail 
(event log 
processing)  
Misuse, 
Anomaly 
Not 
identified 
Simulation Dynamic 
intrusion 
detection 
hierarchy 
model 
B. Sun, 
K.Wu, and 
U. W. Pooch 
[47] 
ZBIDS Distributed 
and 
collaborative 
No Yes 
(Disruption 
attacks) 
No Audit trail 
(event log 
processing)  
Anomaly DSR Simulation Routing 
protocol 
protection from 
disruption 
 
TABLE 1: Comparison researches achievement on the MANET IDS. 
  
5. CONSLUSION & FUTURE WORK 
With the nature of mobile ad hoc networks, almost all of the intrusion detection systems (IDSs) 
are structured to be distributed and have a cooperative architecture (see table 1). Refer to the 
table 1, mostly the proposed research prefers using anomaly detection approach. An intrusion 
detection system aims to detect attacks on mobile nodes or intrusions into the networks. 
However, attackers may try to attack the IDS system itself. Accordingly, the study of the defense 
to such attacks should be explored as well. 
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